War Diary Day 5: US-Israel war against Iran shifts to attrition – World

On the fifth day of the US-Israel war against Iran, the conflict is in a position that neither side could have fully anticipated when the first attacks were launched on February 28.

The United States and Israel may have achieved clear tactical air dominance over large areas of Iran, with fixed air defense networks degraded, leaders hit at the highest levels, and naval assets, primarily at the docks, having suffered significant damage. However, the strategic landscape remains unstable and, in some respects, increasingly complicated.

The first hours of the war were decisive in military terms. Stealth platforms penetrated any air defense Iran possessed after last year’s 12-day war, followed by waves of bombers that suppressed what were once key elements of the integrated air defense system.

The US-Israeli objectives were not symbolic but structural, including leadership nodes, fixed military infrastructure, naval platforms, and border posts. The assassination of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, was intended to decapitate the system and induce dislocation at the top of command.

Decapitation occurred, but not dislocation.

Iran’s governance and warfare model, long considered decentralized and multi-layered, has demonstrated redundancy, especially after recent changes and what Iranian officials call the “Decentralized Mosaic Defense” (DMD) strategy, under which authority has been diffused across dispersed nodes, while operational continuity has been preserved. Thanks to the adapted military strategy, five days later, there are no signs of systemic collapse despite the massive decapitation blows suffered by Iran and, militarily speaking, a progressive degradation of fixed systems.

The Iranian S300 and Bavar batteries have lost most of their fixed radars and command centers, allowing US and Israeli aircraft to operate relatively freely in Iranian airspace. Precision munitions have been dropped near Tehran and, at the same time, surface naval losses have been significant: eight ships are reported to have been severely damaged, many of them while in dock, including the submarine Fateh.

The torpedoing of the Iranian frigate IRIS Dena by a US submarine in international waters off the southern coast of Sri Lanka on Wednesday has dramatically expanded the geographical scope of the war, bringing the US-Iran conflict directly into the South Asian maritime space for the first time. This attack, which occurred approximately 75 kilometers from Galle, in waters far removed from the Persian Gulf, indicates that the coalition is now willing to pursue Iranian naval assets globally.

Despite all these limitations and setbacks, the Iranian response has not been structured around symmetrical retaliation. Instead, it has been that of calibrated saturation. In four days, 871 missiles and 1,126 drones were directed against Gulf targets. Although interception rates in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar remained high, exceeding 90 percent, the volume has produced a cumulative effect. On the other hand, Gulf states’ interceptor stocks are rapidly depleting and may run out in days if not replenished immediately.

Meanwhile, seven radar and communications systems, including two AN/GSC-52B SATCOM terminals at the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain, the AN FPS 132 early warning radar at Al Udeid, facilities at Camp Arifjan in Kuwait, and ancillary facilities linked to the satellite communications infrastructure at Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait, have been destroyed, leading to the degradation of the C4ISR. (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, (surveillance and reconnaissance) at key regional bases, which could temporarily blind or seriously hamper the coordination of real-time missile defense, long-distance communications and situational awareness throughout the theater of operations. In addition, approximately a dozen US personnel have been killed and three F-15E aircraft have been lost, which the Americans, probably as an afterthought, blamed on friendly fire.

While these gains could have been an advantage, the pace of Iranian missiles has moderated in the past 48 hours, not due to exhaustion but due to conservation and other operational limitations. Tehran therefore appears to be adjusting the rate of fire to maintain pressure while forcing adversaries to expend high-value interceptors at a disproportionate cost. This is wear and tear.

The economic theater has expanded more rapidly than the military one. The Strait of Hormuz, although not mined in a physical sense, has been effectively disrupted due to Iranian statements, targeted tanker incidents and rapid insurance withdrawals, leading to trade paralysis and increases in oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) prices. Supply chains linked to Qatar, energy and Saudi exports are under strain. In this context, the insurance and naval escort plans announced by US President Donald Trump represent emergency stabilization measures rather than restoration of normality.

The combined daily economic and operational costs between belligerents and affected states are estimated to be in the range of billions of dollars. It may be very bad news for others, but it aligns with Tehran’s doctrinal emphasis on cost imposition and political exhaustion.

Iran’s activation of its network of allies has followed a deliberate sequence. Hezbollah, which had been relatively calmer after the martyrdom of Hassan Nasrallah, has carried out rocket and drone attacks against Israeli targets, staging a significant comeback, while Iraqi factions have reported multiple daily actions. The Houthis, for their part, have issued threats against Bab el Mandeb and Saudi facilities. There have also been attacks on US diplomatic facilities in the Gulf states. But still, it can be said that no simultaneous bombardment has been launched on all fronts, which implies a controlled escalation without abandoning the thresholds.

The original goals of the United States and Israel were broad. Naval and missile elimination, indirect neutralization, nuclear denial and the fracture of the regime were articulated in different formulations. After five days, these objectives have only been partially met. The Iranian military infrastructure was degraded, while allied networks continued to function and the fracture of the regime had not materialized.

US political messaging also contributed to uncertainty. The initial justification for the attacks focused on preventing an imminent Iranian attack, a claim that was not supported by US intelligence assessments and contradicted by Pentagon reports. The logic then turned to the elimination of naval and missile threats and, subsequently, to broader pressure from the regime, including openness to arming internal militias and Kurdish or Baluchi groups. This evolution revealed that Trump entered the conflict with unclear objectives and exit criteria.

The moral dimension has deepened the challenge, further delegitimizing the already illegitimate war. The first wave of attacks caused significant civilian casualties and more than 160 schoolgirls were martyred on the first day. In the following days, the Gandhi Hospital in Tehran was attacked and parts of the Golestan Palace, recognized by UNESCO as a World Heritage Site, were also destroyed. Commentary in Persian and regional analysis in Arabic have called these attacks disproportionate and strategically reckless, helping Tehran’s existential defense narrative gain traction.

A new layer is emerging in this conflict along Iran’s western border. Multiple attacks have targeted border patrols and regular army units. Intelligence assessments suggest that the attacks are intended to weaken perimeter control and create opportunities for Iraq-based Kurdish armed insurgents being armed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to spur an internal uprising. Trump has engaged with the leader of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, Mustafa Hijri, while another Kurdish insurgent group, the Kurdistan Free Life Party, remains designated under US Treasury restrictions. Baloch militant groups have reorganized under a national opposition banner and have allegedly smuggled weapons since 2025.

This substitute strategy introduces unpredictable variables and lacks unified command and control over armed groups. The Syrian experience offers cautionary lessons, but in the case of Iran, its size, ethnic diversity and deep-rooted national identity can lead to consolidation rather than fragmentation. Turkish sensitivity to Kurdish precedents, Pakistani concerns over Baloch ties, and other regional dynamics could produce regional alignment in the face of perceived territorial threats.

Within Iran, succession mechanisms are in place. The Assembly of Experts is expected to formalize the leadership transition despite the bombing of its offices in Qom on Tuesday and the Israeli threat to attack the new leaders.

Three scenarios dominate current assessments. Prolonged, high-intensity attrition is most likely with regionalization, where missile exchanges, maritime disruption, and gradual proxy activity continue. A second possibility involves controlled escalation across peripheral fronts without full enlargement. A third, less likely but significant, is internal consolidation, which reinforces the cohesion of the regime.

Key variables include the sustainability of the interceptor, economic tolerance in the Gulf states, and political resistance in Washington and allied capitals.

Five days later, the arithmetic of the conflict is becoming clearer with the US-Israel coalition dominating the skies and having degraded visible assets. Meanwhile, Iran has retained dispersed capabilities, imposed asymmetric costs, and turned war into an endurance test. In this phase, resistance may outweigh shock.

At the same time, diplomatic space is shrinking. Attempts at mediation through Oman and Qatar have been rejected by Tehran, which presents the conflict as an endurance test that must end on its own terms.

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Banner image: A man walks past buildings destroyed after airstrikes in central Tehran on March 4, 2026. — AFP